INTRODUCTION
Angry protesters crowd around the entrance to a women's healthcare facility in Massachusetts. They yell obscenities and furiously shake signs with intimidating messages. One protester even throws an object at a patient walking toward the entrance. Contrast this scene with peaceful sidewalk counselors, whose purpose is to engage patients in quiet conversations about other options besides abortion. A counselor tries to walk alongside a patient to deliver her message, but she is quickly stopped thirty-five feet before the entrance, where a line painted on the sidewalk marks where a buffer zone begins. Just when the patient was beginning to listen, the counselor's message is lost.
Massachusetts, in addition to various other states and localities, 1 took statutory steps to prevent protesters from committing acts of violence and harassment outside of abortion facilities. 2 For Massachusetts, this included enacting a law restricting people, besides patients or employees, from entering a zone within absence of language indicating McCullen overruled prior case law upholding buffer zones, both state and local governments have acted as if little is left of those prior decisions. The Note proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the leading precedent prior to McCullen and the influential plaintiff that led to the McCullen Court's decision. Part II examines the reaction of state and local governments that placed an injunction on or eliminated entirely their buffer zone laws after the McCullen decision. The Note argues that states and localities recognized the risk of litigation regarding existing buffer zone laws. Part III describes buffer zone laws that were amended to more narrowly tailored solutions and demonstrates that some localities did not view buffer zones as a valid option post-McCullen. However, in Part IV, this Note considers a counterexample to the limited power of pre-McCullen precedent and shows that a buffer zone law upheld pre-McCullen may still be valid even after the Court's newly rendered decision.
I. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SPEAKS ON BUFFER ZONES
A buffer zone is defined as "any area serving to mitigate or neutralize potential conflict." It creates a space for protection outside of healthcare facility entrances that no patron can enter besides a patient or, in some circumstances, an employee of the healthcare facility. Massachusetts legislators created the statute in response to repeated incidents of violence outside of healthcare facilities, as a way to eliminate intimidation and allow patient access. 8 The Massachusetts statute that was challenged in McCullen contained the following provision:
No person shall knowingly enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk adjacent to a reproductive health care facility within a radius of [thirty-five] feet of any portion of an entrance, exit or driveway of a reproductive health care facility or within the area within a rectangle created by extending the outside boundaries of any entrance, exit or driveway of a reproductive health care facility in straight lines to the point where such lines intersect the sideline of the street in front of such entrance, exit or driveway. 9 7 Buffer Zone, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/buffer%20zone?s=t (last visited Oct. 16, 2015 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." 10 Though the government's ability to restrict speech in traditional public fora is limited, the government has leeway to regulate features of speech unrelated to its content.
11
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the U.S. Supreme Court set out the following test for determining the constitutionality of restrictions on speech: the government may put "reasonable restrictions on the time, place [,] or manner of protected speech," so long as the "restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information."
12
It was the "narrowly tailored" prong that the Massachusetts statute failed in McCullen, because the statute burdened more speech than necessary in an area of traditional public fora, and Massachusetts failed to try less intrusive alternatives.
13
A. (1997) . A preliminary injunction was issued in New York to aid police in response to protestors blocking abortion clinic entrances. Id. at 357. The injunction established a fifteen-foot fixed buffer zone and fifteen-foot floating buffer zone. Id. The fixed zone prevented demonstrating within fifteen feet of doorways, doorway entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways, and driveway entrances of clinic facilities. Id. The floating zone prevented protestors from coming within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle. Id. The Court determined that the governmental interests in ensuring public safety and order, promoting free flow of traffic, protecting property rights, and protecting women's freedom to seek pregnancy-related services were significant. Id. at 358. The Court invalidated the floating buffer zone, however, because it prevented protesters from communicating a message within a normal, conversational distance or handing out leaflets on the public sidewalks. Id. In contrast, the Court said the fixed buffer zone was necessary to prevent hindering people from entering and exiting. Id. at 359. The Court agreed with the district court that the fifteen-foot distance would ensure access, and that protesters remain free to communicate their message outside the zone. Id. at 385. See also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (upholding a thirty-six-foot fixed buffer zone outside healthcare facilities but striking down restrictions on displaying images and approaching patients within three hundred feet). In Hill, the Court evaluated a Colorado statute that created an eight-foot floating bubble zone within a one-hundred-foot radius of healthcare facility entrances.
15
No protestor or sidewalk counselor could come within eight feet of a patient within this one-hundred-foot zone. 16 The majority's opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, emphasized that the law did not focus on deterring unwanted speech, but it intended to protect those seeking treatment from unwanted communication. 17 Furthermore, the Colorado law did not draw distinctions based on the subject matter of the speech, but it applied equally to all people. 18 The Court held that the eight-foot barrier was not an unconstitutional burden on free speech because signs, pictures, and voices could cross an eight-foot gap with ease. 19 The Court reasoned that an eight-foot separation would not have any adverse impact on the patient's ability to read signs displayed by demonstrators and would not prevent a speaker from communicating at a normal, conversational distance. 20 Additionally, the statute did not prevent a leafletter from standing near the path of oncoming pedestrians and handing out material, which the patients could easily accept.
21
Many localities wanting to deter violent protesters relied on the Hill decision when enacting buffer zone laws around women's healthcare facilities. For example, after the Hill decision, the Massachusetts legislature used the Hill Court's opinion as a guide when enacting a variation for its own state's law. The statute made it a crime to knowingly stand on a 15 Hill, 530 U.S. at 707. 16 Id. 17 Id. at 715-16. 18 Id. at 723 ("Instead of drawing distinctions based on the subject that the approaching speaker may wish to address, the statute applies equally to used car salesmen, animal rights activists, fundraisers, environmentalists, and missionaries."). 19 Id. at 729. 20 Id. 21 Id. at 727 (footnote omitted). public way or sidewalk within thirty-five feet of an entrance or driveway to any reproductive health care facility, punishable by a fine of up to five-hundred dollars, three months in prison, or both. 24 The Court agreed that public safety, patient access to healthcare, and the unobstructed use of public sidewalks and roadways were legitimate government interests. 25 However, the Court reasoned that the statute imposed serious burdens on free speech in an area typically open to the public, depriving protesters of their two primary methods of communicating with arriving patients: close personal conversations and distribution of leaflets.
26
The protesters sought not merely to express their opposition to abortion, but to engage in "sidewalk counseling," which they described as caring, consensual conversations about various alternatives to abortion. 27 The buffer zones eliminated the protesters' messages and substantially burdened more speech than necessary.
28
In its opinion, the Court emphasized other avenues for patient protection that do not restrict speech as substantially as the buffer zone law.
29
Early in the McCullen opinion, the Court distinguished the petitioners from other protestors.
30
It associated protestors with signs, chants, and more aggressive methods, like face-to-face confrontation.
31
In contrast, sidewalk counselors considered it essential to maintain a caring demeanor, a calm tone of voice, and direct eye contact during conversations. 32 The petitioners asserted that confrontational methods, including shouting and waving signs, antagonized women and were less effective. 26 Id. at 2536. 27 Id. at 2535. 28 Id. at 2537. 29 Id. at 2538-39. 30 Id. at 2527. 31 Id. The Court then proceeded to give specific examples of how Ms. McCullen and the rest of the petitioners were forced to stand on the opposite side of the road of the three clinics due to the buffer zone law, resulting in many fewer conversations and many fewer distributions of leaflets on public sidewalks since the zone went into effect. 34 The opinion described how the law placed a serious burden on petitioners' conversations.
35
For example, Ms. McCullen was unable to distinguish patients in time before they entered the buffer zone.
36
When she was able to initiate a conversation, she had to stop abruptly at the buffer zone, which made her appear "untrustworthy" or "suspicious," and she often needed to raise her voice at patients from outside the zone, which was at odds with the compassionate message she wished to convey. 37 Likewise, literature was less likely to be accepted because the petitioners could not approach women in time to place literature near their hands.
38
Although the petitioners could engage in forms of protest outside of the zone, the buffer zone had made it impossible for them to effectively convey their message "through personal, caring, consensual conversations."
39
As a seventy-seven-year-old grandmother, Eleanor McCullen represented a peaceful sidewalk counselor well. 40 She centered her advocacy on gentleness and love, and she found violence and anger to be counterproductive. 41 Since the Court must consider the party in front of it, the anti-abortion advocates 42 presented a party 34 Id. at 2527-28 (describing the thwarted efforts of the petitioners at the Boston, Worcester, and Springfield clinics). 35 Id. at 2535-36. 36 Id. at 2535. 37 Id. 38 Id. at 2536. 39 Id. that embodied everything a violent protestor is not. Ms. McCullen hardly looked like a threat, and the Massachusetts buffer zone law looked extremely oppressive when applied to her. A law that criminalized a grandmother who wanted to quietly and gently exercise her freedom of speech in a traditional public forum was not a law the Court was willing to uphold. 43 When examined previously by lower courts, the First Circuit sustained the Massachusetts buffer zone law against a First Amendment challenge due to the Hill precedent. 44 The First Circuit majority recognized that the Massachusetts statute had been modeled from the Colorado statute in Hill, though there were distinguishing characteristics between the two. 45 In contrast to the First Circuit, the McCullen majority did not mention Hill at all in the opinion other than in the procedural history. 46 Furthermore, the majority gave no indication that Hill had been overruled. 47 Was the preservation of Hill a precondition for Justices that were part of the majority in Hill to join the more conservative majority of a seemingly 
II. REPEALING BUFFER ZONES ENTIRELY
Despite no particular direction from the McCullen Court as to whether any buffer zone law could be narrowly tailored to pass the test of constitutionality, many localities, after the McCullen decision, were forced to reexamine their buffer zone laws before and after lawsuits ensued.
A. New Hampshire
On June 10, 2014, New Hampshire signed into law Senate Bill 319-FN, a bipartisan effort that created a twenty-five-foot fixed buffer zone outside of reproductive health care facilities 
52
Before the New Hampshire buffer zone law had gone into effect and signs had been installed, the Supreme Court declared the similarly-structured Massachusetts law unconstitutional in McCullen. 53 When suit in New Hampshire immediately followed, the U.S. District Court of New Hampshire ordered that the state not enforce the new buffer zone law and issued a stay on the law indefinitely. 54 The order stated that if healthcare facilities were to display the signs contemplated by the buffer zone law, the court would then decide whether to issue a preliminary injunction. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/10/new-hampshire-taking-up-abortion-clinicbuffer-zon/ ("Democratic Sen. Donna Soucy of Manchester, who sponsored the original buffer zone bill, told the committee she believes it is constitutional because it's crafted more narrowly than the Massachusetts law. Any facilities wishing to enact a buffer zone would be required to put up signs marking the zone and consult with local officials."). 60 Id. ("Rep. Kathleen Souza, a Manchester Republican and co-sponsor of the repeal bill, said the repeal is needed to ward off a costly lawsuit and because harassment is not occurring outside such facilities. 
B. Portland, Maine
Officials in Portland, Maine, went further than the New Hampshire legislature and eliminated all restrictions around reproductive healthcare facilities entirely.
62
In Portland, members of the City Council recognized an atmosphere of intimidation and shaming of people trying to access their city's abortion clinic. 63 On November 18, 2013, all nine members of the Portland City Council voted to enact an ordinance that created a thirty-nine-foot buffer zone around the three entrances of a single abortion clinic in downtown Portland.
64
The ordinance, titled "Access to Reproductive Health Care Facilities," had the purpose "to balance both the fundamental right to assemble peacefully and to demonstrate on matters of public concern, with the right to seek and obtain reproductive health care services." 
67
This ended anti-abortion advocates' pending challenges to the law before a judge could make a decision, and the Portand City Council has not yet enacted a new ordinance in its place. 68 Though the McCullen Court gave no specific limit to buffer zone size, a fixed buffer zone with an additional four feet would likely face even greater challenges in passing the narrow tailoring analysis. 69 While the right to seek and obtain reproductive healthcare services would likely be considered a legitimate interest, 70 pushing protestors thirty-nine feet from the entrance would similarly compromise the protestors' ability to initiate conversations and would effectively shield their message.
71
Preventing conversations would burden more speech than necessary, and a court would likely need proof that less intrusive methods were attempted. 
III. BRINGING MORE NARROWLY TAILORED SOLUTIONS
Rather than abandoning the government's interest in preventing harassment, intimidation, and patient access around women's healthcare facilities, some localities have developed new laws post-McCullen that serve the same purposes as buffer zone laws without putting restrictions on free speech within a fixed zone.
A. Massachusetts
After failure in McCullen, the Massachusetts legislature attempted to refine its law with a more narrowly tailored solution. Instead of focusing on a buffer zone, 66 Fitzgerald, 2014 WL 5473026, at *1. 67 Id. at *4. 68 Id. at *10. 69 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). 70 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014) ("[R]espondents claim that the Act promotes 'public safety, patient access to healthcare, and the unobstructed use of public sidewalks and roadways.'" (internal citation omitted)). 71 Id. at 2536-37. 72 Id. at 2538-39. In July of 2015, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick signed the law, which permitted police to order anyone who "impedes" people entering or exiting abortion clinics to move twenty-five feet away from the clinic until it closes for the day.
74
People who resist the new law could still face a five-hundred dollar fine and jail time. 75 The new Massachusetts law is a state version of the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE"), which "prohibits the use of force, physical act [,] or threat of force directed at an individual attempting to access or depart from a reproductive health facility." 76 The new Massachusetts law takes into account the McCullen Court's opinion and does a better job of balancing the rights of protestors and the rights of patients. Under the new law, sidewalk counselors can speak with patients within the buffer zone range so long as they do not interfere with the government's interests in preventing harassment and blocking of facility entrances. No burden would then be placed upon Ms. McCullen and other sidewalk counselors' speech, as they could peacefully initiate conversations and hand out leaflets without a buffer zone to stifle their messages.
B. Madison, Wisconsin
The Hill Court precedent was further weakened when the City Attorney in Madison, Wisconsin, advised the City Council to stop enforcing the eight-foot floating bubble zone that prevented protestors from passing a leaflet, displaying a sign, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling within one-hundred-andsixty feet from a healthcare facility entrance.
77
Though this ordinance was more similar to the bubble zone ruled constitutional in Hill, the Madison City Attorney said that the city was not able to enforce the ordinance in light of McCullen and that keeping the law would expose the city to additional lawsuits. While eliminating the buffer zone, the City Council revised the ordinance to focus on activities that might prevent patient access. 80 The amendments prohibited anyone from physically and intentionally hindering a person's entrance or exit and from injuring or threatening to injure that person.
81
The drafter's analysis stated that the amended ordinance would be used in conjunction with other Wisconsin ordinances and statutes. 82 The Madison City Attorney's concern over the ordinance that the City Council unanimously enacted seems to explicitly recognize that little is left of Hill. The Western District of Wisconsin had spoken pre-McCullen, and though the court expressed that it found the precedent troubling, it was constrained by Hill and ruled the ordinance valid.
83
The court ultimately deemed the city ordinance constitutional because the differences between the Madison ordinance and the Colorado statute were not sufficient enough to distinguish them and to come to a different result regarding constitutionality. 84 Madison Vigil for Life, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 895-96. The plaintiffs argue that the eight-foot "bubble" zone in Hill extends out to a radius of one hundred feet from the entrance of health care facilities, whereas the eight-foot "bubble" zone in this case extends out in a 160-foot radius. Id. There was also evidence in Hill of demonstrations in front of abortion clinics that had impeded access to those clinics and were often confrontational, whereas the City has proffered no such evidence. Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the definition of "health care facility" appears to vary between the Colorado statute and the ordinance. Id. 85 Id. at 896 (emphasis added). 
C. Burlington, Vermont
The City Attorney recommended examining a Burlington, Vermont, buffer zone ordinance at a July 14, 2014, City Council meeting in Burlington. 88 The City Council stopped enforcing the part of their ordinance which created a thirty-fivefoot buffer zone after McCullen, while still enforcing the part of the ordinance that makes it a crime to block people from entering the clinic.
89
For two-and-one-half months, the City Council and Ordinance Committee took suggestions for an alternative to the thirty-five-foot zone.
90
On October 9, 2014, the Ordinance Committee proposed changes that turned the buffer zone ordinance into a "Reproductive Health Center Access Ordinance."
91
One proposed change added a definition of "harass," while another increased the penalty of noncompliance from five-hundred to eight-hundred dollars.
92
The Burlington City Attorney explained 86 Id. at 896 n.2. 87 Baklinski, supra note 77; MADISON, WIS., GEN. ORD. ch. 23.01. 88 John Dillon, After Supreme Court Rules, Burlington to Amend Clinic Buffer Zone Ordinance, VT. PUB. RADIO (July 2, 2014), http://digital.vpr.net/post/after-supreme-court-rules-burlington-amendclinic-buffer-zone-ordinance. 89 Id. that the words chosen for the amended ordinance had been upheld by courts, thereby minimizing the risk of litigation over the constitutionality of the previous version containing questionable words, such as "intimidation." 93 The final revisions, adopted on October 20, 2014, gave law enforcement officers a right to order individuals who obstruct, detain, hinder, impede, harass, or block another person's entry or exit to move twenty-five feet from the entrance or driveway of the facility for twelve hours. 94 In Clift v. City of Burlington, Vermont, the District Court of Vermont examined the pre-amended ordinance, without the benefit of McCullen, when residents moved for a preliminary injunction. 95 The court relied on Schenck, 96 Madsen, 97 and Hill, as well as other circuit court decisions that "have addressed the constitutionality of provisions that are substantially similar" and ultimately dismissed the preliminary injunction.
98
In one portion of the discussion, the district court addressed the plaintiffs' argument that the Burlington buffer zone ordinance was distinct from and more suspect than the Colorado bubble zone statute in Hill.
99
The court acknowledged the differences in the statutes, themselves, as well as 96 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376-82 (1997) (upholding a fifteen-foot fixed buffer zone was constitutionally permissible but striking down a fifteen-foot floating zone as unconstitutional). 97 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (upholding a thirty-six-foot fixed buffer zone outside healthcare facilities but striking down restrictions on displaying images and approaching patients within three hundred feet). 98 Clift, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 626-29. 99 Id. at 639 ("The Plaintiffs point to language in Hill indicating the Supreme Court's concern with the ability of protesters to 'communicate at a normal conversational distance' and to distribute handbills to unwilling recipients; however, the Court has never held that either form of expression is guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Plaintiffs also contend that the [o] rdinance is more suspect than the statute at issue in Hill because the [o]rdinance applies to willing listeners as well as unwilling ones and because the [o] rdinance regulates all expressive activity, not merely the display of signs, leafleting, and oral speech." (internal citation omitted)). Though the court acknowledged that the Colorado statute was framed more narrowly, it determined that the plaintiffs' distinctions were much less significant than the plaintiffs suggested.
101
The lack of differences between the Colorado statute and the Burlington ordinance was reflected in the post-McCullen amendments to the ordinance: it was not amended to create a floating bubble zone, but rather, it eliminated speech restrictions entirely.
102
If the District Court of Vermont was correct in determining that the differences between the floating bubble zone and a fixed buffer zone are not significant, then after McCullen, Hill seems to retain little precedential value in preserving any type of restricted speech buffer zone.
D. San Francisco, California
San Francisco, California, enacted a buffer zone ordinance as early as 1993.
103
The ordinance prohibited "harassment" by creating an eight-foot bubble zone around anyone within one-hundred feet of a healthcare facility.
104
In 2013, the city revised the ordinance, claiming that the prohibition had proven ineffective in preventing harassment, delay, and deterrence of patients due to the density and space constraints of the city's urban landscape.
105
The new ordinance was almost identical to the thirty-five-foot fixed buffer zone in the Massachusetts statute; it similarly created a twenty-five-foot buffer zone around the entrances, exits, and driveways of reproductive health facilities. 106 100 Id. 101 
Id.
102 BURLINGTON, VT., CODE ch. 14, art. IX, § 21-111 (amended Oct. 20, 2014). 103 S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 43, § § 4301-4304 (added by S.F., Cal., Ordinance 226-93 (1993)) (amended by S.F., Cal., Ordinance 88-13 (2013)) (amended by S.F., Cal., Ordinance 230-14 (2014)), available at http://www.sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/ bdsupvrs/ordinances13/o0088-13.pdf. 104 Id. ("Harassment" was defined in Section 4303 as "knowingly approach [ing] another person within eight feet of such person unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person."). 105 Id. After the McCullen decision, protesters disregarded the painted yellow line and moved closer to the entrance. 107 In response, police used a twenty-year-old section of the city's Municipal Police Code, section 122, that prohibited "aggressive pursuit . . . with the intent to cause annoyance, intimidation or fear on the part of the person being pursued," and defined aggressive pursuit as "willful, malicious or repeated following or harassment of another person." 108 In October of 2014, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors expanded upon this section and combined it with the old buffer zone statute to attempt to comply with McCullen.
109
The new law focuses on the conduct of the individual and the kinds of protests allowed within the zone, rather than banning speech within the zone completely. 110 For example, no protestor is allowed to follow or harass any person within twentyfive feet of the entrance to a reproductive healthcare facility. 111 Under the new ordinance, sidewalk counselors are protected; those wishing to engage in "quiet, consensual conversations" do not fall under the definition of "harassment," and they would be allowed within the twenty-five-foot buffer zone. 112 Furthermore, the ordinance prohibits excessive noise through yelling or amplification of sound within "[fifty] feet of the property line" of the facility. 113 The ordinance also prohibits people from "impeding access to the door" of a facility. 114 If a protestor violates any of the provisions, law enforcement officials could require the person to "disperse and cease to stand or be located within at least twenty-five feet" from the facility for "eight hours or until the close of business."
115
In McCullen, the Court emphasized that to meet the narrow tailoring prong of a First Amendment restriction, "the government must demonstrate that alternative measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to achieve the When San Francisco's buffer zone was no longer enforceable after McCullen and police were left to protect patients by other means, the city was forced to "try other laws already on the books"-a step that the Court said was not taken by Massachusetts before enacting its statute.
117
The question arises whether, by enforcing section 122 of the Municipal Police Code, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors has "shown that it seriously undertook to address the problem with less intrusive tools readily available to it," should those laws that intrude less on free speech fail.
118
If section 122 had done an adequate job of fulfilling the government's interests in protecting abortion clinic patients, then the new buffer zone law that limits the kinds of protests within the zone would be unnecessary, and a court would likely find the new San Francisco ordinance as an intrusion on free speech.
119

IV. FIGHTING FOR BUFFER ZONES TO STAY
Despite the majority of states and localities eliminating their buffer zone laws, the City of Pittsburgh chose to defend its law in court. Due to litigation in the Third Circuit pre-McCullen that had determined the city's buffer zone law was constitutional based upon Hill precedent, the lower court post-McCullen refused to reconsider its old determination. The court asserted that, since the Hill decision was not explicitly overruled, the McCullen Court had left the Hill decision intact.
A. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
In December of 2005, the City Council of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, enacted an ordinance that established an "eight-foot personal bubble zone," as well as a provision that "no person or persons shall knowingly congregate, patrol, picket, or demonstrate in a zone extending fifteen feet from any hospital and or health care facility." prior Supreme Court decisions, the Third Circuit determined that the ordinance was a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation because it prohibited even the exempted classes of persons-those who perform important safety functions-from picketing or demonstrating within the buffer zone. 122 The court said that the law was not imposed because of the content of the speech but because of offensive behavior identified with its delivery in response to aggressive protests and confrontations. 123 However, the court held that the Pittsburgh ordinance's combination of the "bubble zone" and the "buffer zone" was broader than necessary. 124 Though the court recognized Pittsburgh's legitimate interest in protecting those entering healthcare facilities from physical violence and verbal harassment, the statute was not sufficiently tailored. 125 The court said that either of the two zones, standing alone, would advance the ordinance's objectives, but it noted that the combination burdened too much speech. 126 As a result, the Third Circuit remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. 127 Subsequently, the district court issued an order stating that the city must construe the ordinance in a manner that does not permit any person to picket or demonstrate within the boundaries of the fixed buffer zone. 128 The only narrow exemption for inside the zone was for emergency personnel congregating and patrolling "in the course of their official business" and for employees of hospitals and health care facilities, insofar as they are engaged in "assisting patients and other persons to enter or exit" the facility.
129
The order also extended to provide police with oral and written training materials regarding enforcement of the ordinance. On September 4, 2014, another lawsuit ensued after McCullen, when the plaintiffs moved the court to issue a preliminary injunction to restrain the city from enforcing the ordinance.
131
For the first time since McCullen, a court upheld a buffer zone as constitutional, and the court dismissed the motion for preliminary injunction. 132 The District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania distinguished the ordinance from the Massachusetts statute, and it relied on both Brown and Hill in determining its constitutionality. 133 Repeatedly, the court insisted that Hill was not overruled and was still good law. 134 In response to the argument that the ordinance was facially overbroad, the district court acknowledged that McCullen did not reach the issue. Therefore, the McCullen Court did not alter the relevant doctrine from Hill, and the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Brown, where the court relied on Hill, applied. 135 When the plaintiffs argued that the ordinance was content-and viewpoint-based on its face and in application, the court once again contended that the Third Circuit, relying on Hill, had already found the ordinance to be content-neutral. where the counselors could not approach potential patients in order to hand them literature and speak to them in normal, conversational tones. 138 Furthermore, the court said that, unlike in McCullen, alternative channels for sidewalk counseling existed in Pittsburgh, as the Brown court and Hill Court "noted approvingly that . . . the . . . zone allowed leafletters to stand stationary in the path of oncoming pedestrians." 139 Due to the distinguishing factors between the Massachusetts statute and the Pittsburgh ordinance, the court determined that McCullen did not invalidate Pittsburgh's less burdensome ordinance, as the ordinance was narrowly tailored to pursue what the Hill Court determined was a legitimate government interest.
140
The district court, here, was the first court after McCullen to rekindle the flame behind Hill and conclude that the McCullen Court's failure to mention overruling the decision was an indication that Hill remains good law.
141
Rather than using McCullen as a way to reevaluate the ordinance, the court relied on the Third Circuit's previous opinion, which had used Hill, as untouched by the McCullen decision. By distinguishing the Massachusetts statute, the court revitalized the possibility of buffer zone laws and left buffer zone advocates with the hope that a fixed zone which restricts speech could still be considered narrowly tailored. Whether the Third Circuit will once again uphold the Pittsburgh buffer zone law on appeal may test the viability of existing buffer zone laws post-McCullen and will help determine whether the waning authority of Hill still applies.
CONCLUSION
As buffer zone laws continue to be challenged, courts will have to decide whether to construe McCullen broadly, as affecting all existing buffer zone laws, or to limit the decision to laws with substantial similarities to the Massachusetts statute. Left with the vague McCullen precedent, determining what is the proper size of buffer zones or what specific restrictions should be allowed within the zone for a law to be narrowly tailored is left to the discretion of the courts. Despite the fall of many buffer zone laws across the country after McCullen, pro-life advocates will likely continue to challenge any restrictions around women's healthcare 138 Bruni, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 675-76. 139 Id. at 677 (quoting Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 278 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 727-28 (2000))). 140 Id. at 675, 678-79. 141 Id. at 675.
